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Abstract 
 
The redefinition of political communities in Europe has been a process in flux, 
especially since the end of the Cold War. The central role of the EU as an 
“identity builder” (Risse, 2009) among its member states, and to a certain extent 
in its relations with its neighbours, has been increasingly contested, not least in 
its  relations  with  Russia.  Europe  has  been  a  permanent  feature  of  Russia‟s 
identity redefinition following the collapse of the Soviet Union and therefore a 
central  element  shaping  relations  between  the  two  actors.  This  article  puts 
forward  the  argument  that  differences  in  discourse  and  meanings  have  an 
impact  in  policy  outcomes,  as  regards  EU-Russia  relations  and  security  in 
Europe. It surveys fundamental events in European security and the parallel 
evolution in security discourses within the EU and Russia. It, therefore, maps the 
main  elements  shaping  EU-Russia  security  relations,  focusing  on  the 
construction of discursive maps and on how these have impacted bilateral and 
regional security relations.   
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1. Introduction 
The issue of political community formation in international affairs has 
been  consistently  shaped  by  what  can  be  called  the  nationalisation  of  the 
modern  political  communities  (Baker  and  Bartelson,  2009,  p.  3),  i.e.  the 
establishment of the modern nation-state as the measure against which all other 
forms of political community are assessed. This has reinforced the socio-cultural 
homogeneity and territorial boundedness of the modern political communities, 
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as opposed to a focus on the values and norms guiding political communities. 
The  notion  that  political  communities  exist  beyond  the  nation  state,  to 
incorporate human collectives, sharing a common set of ideas and notions, has 
remained rather underdeveloped in International Relations. 
The European Union (EU) has stood as an important challenge to theorists 
of political communities due to the hybrid nature of its sovereignty, overlapping 
national boundaries and an emerging European polity with a strong normative 
nature (Linklater, 2009). Although the nation-state is still a central element of 
the  contemporary  European  political  experience,  and  supra-nationalist  and 
federalist  conceptions  of  the  European  political  project  have  lost  momentum 
(Habermas,  2002,  p.  59),  the  seeds  to  establish  a  supra-national  European 
identity  exist  in  Europe.  The  EU  is  an  “active  identity  builder”  in  Europe 
through its polity and its interaction with the states and the people of Europe 
(Risse,  2009, p.  154).  It  defines  standards  for its members,  for  new  ones to 
access it, but also in its relations with the outside world, between those within 
and beyond its borders. 
The neighbourhood policy is an example of this active construction of 
Europe‟s  social  identities,  defining  the  features  of  the  members  of  the 
community,  but  also  its  boundaries.  In  the  Maghreb  and  the  Middle  East,  a 
boundary  has  been  established  setting  the  political  and  cultural  borders  of 
Europe, arguably reinforcing an exclusionary view of the European identity. In 
the Eastern neighbourhood, the construction of boundaries (or walls to use Iver 
Neumann‟s expression (1997, p. 148)) has also been a constitutive element in 
Europe‟s identity definition. For the Central and Eastern European countries, 
membership  to  the  European  Communities  and  NATO  was  a  matter  of 
“returning  to  Europe”.  Under  the  neighbourhood  policy,  the  EU  sought  to 
reactivate this idea and provide an incentive to Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and 
the South Caucasus countries to reform, under limited possibilities of integration 
into  the  EU.  The  definition  of  common  values  and  shared  principles  as  the 
foundations of this relationship was a fundamental aspect of this initiative. Its 
limitations became visible when the construction of the neighbours‟ identity as 
European became actively linked to accession demands. It can be argued that the 
redefinition  of  identities  in  Europe  and  the  setting  of  the  boundaries  of  the 
European political community were being managed from the EU side of the 
partnership,  in  a  display  of  realist  political  behaviour,  based  on  power 
asymmetries, and empowering the EU as normative empire in the Wider Europe 
(Laïdi, 2008b). This situation partly explains the limited reform achievements of 
the neighbourhood policy.  
Identity construction in Russia has also been significantly shaped by the 
idea  of  Europe  (Neumann,  1996;  Allison,  Light  and  White,  2006;  Morozov, 
2007). Russians regard themselves as Europeans, but also, Eurasian, and also 
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define.  For  the  liberals  supporting  closer  ties  to  Europe,  Russia  is  a  part  of 
European history and identity and it should strive for closer relations with the 
EU and the European states. For those advocating the unique nature of Russian 
identity,  Eurasianism  has  been  an  appealing  notion  portraying  Russia  as  the 
bridge between Europe and Asia (Thorun, 2009, p. 35). This unsettled identity is 
the result  of  historical,  geographic  and  political  contexts,  which  have  placed 
great pressure on Russia to rediscover its identity and purpose in the post-Cold 
War context, both in global and regional terms.  
The close interaction between identity perceptions and the consolidation 
of a new regional order in Europe, after the Cold War, is the main argument of 
this article. Building on the relations between the EU and Russia on their shared 
neighbourhood,  the  article  sheds  light  on  the  relevance  of  identity  building 
processes for regional security in Europe. How is security in Europe taken as a 
central  part  of  the  new  identities  developing  in  the  EU  and  in  post-Soviet 
Russia? What sort of international actors are the EU and Russia becoming and 
how  has  that  affected  their  foreign  policy  options  in  Europe?  Overall,  both 
Russia  and  the  EU  have  developed  into  two  very  different  actors  and  their 
relations  have  reflected  this  disparate  nature.  Taking  this  reflection  on  how 
political communities come to define their identities and how that process is 
mutually  shaped  and  shapes  other  communities‟  identities,  the  question  then 
arises as to the role of this interaction in European and Russian identities.  
The article takes three recent crucial events in EU-Russia relations, with 
implications for the conceptualisation and the rendering operational of security 
in Europe. The first is EU and NATO enlargements of 2004. This was a turning 
point  in  Europe‟s  conceptualisation  as  a  regional  power  of  continental 
dimensions,  with  increased  security  responsibilities.  For  Russia  this  was  a 
turning point in its perception of EU enlargements. If in previous moments the 
EU was seen as a rather benign neighbour, in 2004 the scope of its enlargement 
and  the  inclusion  of  former-Soviet  states  considerably  changed  Russia‟s 
perception of the EU.  
A second event analysed here is the Ukrainian elections of 2004 and the 
developments of the orange revolution. EU support for the reformist pro-western 
movement  led  by  President  Yuchshenko  and  the  campaign  pushing  for 
Ukrainian accession to NATO radically changed Russia‟s perceptions of the EU. 
Moreover, the debacle of this process was also an important lesson for the EU, 
as  regards  the  limits  of  its  power  and  Russia‟s  influence  in  the  shared 
neighbourhood. A third and final event is the war in Georgia, in the summer of 
2008. The war was a turning point in Russia‟s assertiveness in the former-Soviet 
space and a clear challenge to the EU‟s (and NATO‟s) growing engagement in 
the South Caucasus. For the EU, it also represented a challenge to its normative 
standing and a reminder of the increasing difficulties, but urgent need to engage 
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of perceptions and discourses developing in the EU and in Russia and flashing 
out the links to policy outcomes.  
 
2. EU 2004 Enlargement 
EU  enlargements  have  been  portrayed  as  the  Union‟s  most  effective 
foreign policy tool. Through enlargement, the EU consolidates a regional order 
based on a set of principles defined by its members and its institutions, and 
reflecting  the  shared  values  of  its  political  community.  The  deepening  and 
widening processes of European integration have historically advanced based on 
security concerns in Europe, which functionalists regarded as best addressed by 
technical and function-oriented cooperation among nations in Europe. Liberalists 
regarded  increasing  interdependence  levels,  namely  on  trade  and  cultural 
relations, as an effective tool to anchor European interests in a common goal of 
shared peace and prosperity. The former External Relations and Neighbourhood 
Commissioner  Benita  Ferrero-Waldner  referred  to  the  EU‟s  export  of  its 
governance  model  as  “soft  and  smart  power”  to  project  security  and  create 
prosperity”  (Ferrero-Waldner,  2008).  Besides  this  dimension  of  regional 
integration, seeking to develop a common economic space, upon which political 
and  security  coordination  could  develop,  one  should  not  neglect  the  deep 
meaning  that  European  integration  processes  had  on  the  (re)definition  of 
national identities in Europe, and the consolidation of what Waever has called a 
security community (Waever, 1998).  
All these changes have increasingly placed the EU as a post-modern actor 
in international relations, if not devoid of state-based power concerns, at least 
heavily  influenced  by  a  multi-level  governance  model  and  normative  goals, 
relying  on  structural  power.  As  cited  in  Averre  (2009,  p.  1690),  Lukyanov 
(2008, p. 1114) makes the argument that  
Due to diﬀerences in political culture, Russians ﬁnd it very diﬃcult 
to  understand  the  complex  post-modernist  logic  which  Europe 
declares... for Russia, this is the traditional understanding of force, 
based on economic and military–political levers; whereas for the 
European Union, it is soft power used to expand the European legal 
space  and  make  the  European  model  more  attractive  to 
neighbouring countries.  
Opinions in Russia regarding the advantages of closer cooperation with 
Europe  have  evolved  throughout  time.  Some  regarded  it  as  an  area  where 
mutually advantageous relations should be pursued, assuring that Europe would 
not  transform  Russia  into  a  “raw  materials  appendage”,  but  could  make  a 
contribution to Russia‟s democratisation and development (Allison, Light and 
White, 2006, p. 152-5), as well as to advance its goals of establishing a multi-
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and divided, and the Kremlin has favoured a bilateral approach to its relations 
with the EU. Russia has also failed to clearly make the argument of how much it 
regards the EU as a priority in its foreign policy, at times pushing for a closer 
partnership with Europe (as in the case of the new European security treaty 
advocated  by  President  Medvedev),  and  at  other  times,  displaying  a  clear 
prioritisation of the United States (US), seeking to be recognised as a great 
power. As argued by Markarychev (2009, p. 5) “under closer scrutiny, despite 
surprisingly  normative  language,  Russia‟s  opposition  to  the  US-driven 
unipolarity appears rather inconsistent. For Moscow, Washington is certainly 
not a Schmittian enemy threatening it militarily, but rather an opponent who 
refuses to admit Russia as an equal partner in security building”. 
The development of relations with the EU is therefore inconsistent and 
dependent on the interpretations advanced at a particular time. Either privileging 
a pragmatic approach, based on coinciding strategic interests, or promoting an 
alternative international order, Moscow and Brussels have failed to root their 
partnership on a clear understanding of what their discourses mean. The EU has 
also contributed to this confusion, seeking to be recognised as a different kind of 
actor  in  the  international  system.  Its  governance  is  complex  and  hard  to 
understand by its closest partners, including Russia; and its ambitions to set itself 
as the yard-stick against which political relations should be assessed in Europe 
has  also  been  contested.  The  EU‟s  regional  normative  hegemony,  although 
increasingly consolidated through enlargement and the neighbourhood policy, 
has also faced increasing challenges by those standing aside these processes, or 
those prevented from having an active voice within them. The EU, although 
refusing to establish new division lines in Europe through enlargement, is doing 
just  that  by  not  creating  flexible  ways  of  engaging  non-members  in  its 
governance system. This has poised Russia on a conservative note, regarding the 
expansion of the EU.  
According  to  one  commentator,  “the  enlargement  of  the  EU,  initially 
perceived as an objective process in the development of post-bipolar Europe, is 
today  more  and  more  often  seen  by  many  in  Russia  as  a  source  of  new 
challenges [linked with] rivalry in the post-Soviet space” (Arbatova, 2006, p.15–
16, cited in Averre, 2009, p. 1691). The disputes over influence in the so-called 
“shared neighbourhood” have added tension in EU-Russia relations. As a result 
of the EU 2004 enlargement, the establishment of the neighbourhood policy and 
the  EU‟s  closest  attention  to  political  developments  in  Georgia  and  Ukraine 
provided  perhaps  the  moment  of  the  greatest  tension  in  EU-Russia  relations 
since NATO‟s intervention in Kosovo. As Fernandes and Sim￣o have argued 
(2010, p. 113-114)  
Russia views the overall ENP as interference in its „near abroad‟. 
This is less problematic than the engagement of NATO or the U.S. 
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but it nevertheless provokes a will to reassert Russian power and 
sovereignty.  Globally,  EU  post-enlargement  ambitions  in  the 
common  neighbourhood  are  those  of  a  post-modern  actor,
1  in 
contrast with traditional Russian sovereign prerogatives. Instead of 
becoming an idealised European partner, Russia is becoming, in 
the EU perspective, a challenging foreign policy actor. 
Whereas the EU was presenting the 2004 enlargement as an opportunity 
to reunite the continent and bring Central and Eastern European countries to take 
part in European integration, the creation of the neighbourhood policy denotes 
recognition  by  the  EU  that  integration  processes  do  create  new  borders  in 
Europe, between those in and those outside of the EU. Russia‟s demand to be 
treated by the EU as a strategic partner, outside of the framework of the ENP, 
was a clear statement that Moscow would challenge this revisionist EU notion of 
a  wider  Europe,  and  would  fight  for  its  influence  in  the  Commonwealth  of 
Independent States (CIS). As the next sections on Ukraine‟s political path since 
the orange revolution up to the 2009 elections and on the Georgian war in 2008 
illustrate, Moscow has challenged the EU‟s pretensions to be the uncontested 
pole of attraction in Europe and the main source of norms and rules for relations 
in the European space.   
Averre (2008; 2009) and Popescu (2006) have argued that Moscow has 
engaged in its own soft power expansion, challenging the EU. Popescu talks 
about a “smart authoritarianism”, based on the creation of an infrastructure of 
ideas,  institutions  and  civil  society  organisations  linked  to  the  presidential 
administration.  These  infrastructures  are  aimed  at  positioning  Russia  as  an 
alternative pole of attraction in Europe, proposing an alternative regional order, 
equally aimed at providing for security in Europe. As Averre (2009, p. 1696) 
refers,  Moscow  is  keen  to  illustrate  the  dangers  of  the  EU‟s  “forceful” 
democratisation in the wider European space and, instead, proposes a normative 
framework  based  on  sovereignty,  regime  stability,  non-interference  and 
evolutionary models of governance change. Laïdi (2008a, p. 136) has hinted that 
such  trends  are  visible  at  the  global  level,  with  a  “race  between  global 
governance via norms and „realist‟ governance by states” taking place.  
These  competing  visions  of  the  European  integration  and  enlargement 
processes and of what the regional European order should look like have quite 
often set the EU and Russia in opposite logics, making the development of their 
bilateral  relations  harder  and  with  a  negative  impact  on  their  shared 
neighbourhood. Competition for influence is now established as the underlying 
logic  in  Eurasia,  with  an  impact  in  terms  of  political  (in)stability,  missed 
economic opportunities, challenged cultural conceptions and even hard-security 
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breaches,  as  was the case  in  Georgia. The  next section  looks at the  case  of 
Ukraine and illustrates the competition for political influence. 
 
3. Colour Revolutions: Ukraine 
 Moreover,  and  this  must  be  said  straight  out,  the  possibility  of 
NATO‟s expansion to Ukraine, which Russia‟s elite views as a vital 
threat to its security, has created and maintains – for as long as this 
possibility exists – a threat of a large-scale war in Europe, which 
may escalate unpredictably. (Valdai Club, 2010)  
This statement included in the Valdai Club‟s report on Euro-Atlantic 
security is rather illustrative of the importance Russian elites attach to Ukraine 
and  of  Moscow‟s  need  for  strong  rhetoric  regarding  the  possibility  that 
Ukraine‟s accession to NATO might become the ultimate destabilising factor in 
the  Euro-Atlantic  security.  These  views  are  the  culmination  of  a  period  of 
contested  influence  over  the  political  fate  of  Ukraine  and  other  countries  in 
Eurasia.  In  order  to  retell  this  story,  so  as  to  illustrate  the  different 
conceptualisations of European security by the EU and Russia, it is necessary to 
start  with  the  presentation  of  the  events  of  the  orange  revolution  in  2004, 
followed  by  Kiev‟s  path  to  Euro-Atlantic  integration,  which  paradoxically 
culminated  with  the  election  of  Viktor  Yanukovich  in  2010  as  President, 
arguably reversing the orange and pro-western tide.  
The contestation of the election results, in Kiev, in late 2004, has been 
perceived through different lenses. For some, it was the wilful action of the 
Ukrainian  people  to  denounce  corruption  and  fraud  as  unacceptable  for  the 
country‟s political future, and a committed choice of its leadership to follow a 
Western  model  of  development  (Kuzio,  2007).  The  political  action  plan 
presented by the pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, detailed the steps 
Ukraine would seek to take in order to fully anchor its presence in Europe: “first 
to achieve recognition of market economy status, second to accede to the WTO, 
third to become an associate member of the EU, and fourth, in the long run, to 
become a full member state” (Emerson, 2004, p. 3). The reaction by the EU 
leaders,  namely  in  the  Council,  to  the  events  in  Ukraine  was  positive  and 
supportive, but also careful as not to make commitments to the orange revolution 
leadership‟s  claims  of  future  accession  to  the  EU.  Emerson  (2004,  p.  3) 
underlines  the  subtle  change  in  the  EU  rhetoric:  whilst  initially  making 
“explicitly negative remarks about the new neighbours having no membership 
perspectives, now the discourse seems to be cutting out the negatives, saying 
that while accession is not on the agenda, no doors are closed for the future”.  
Although  this  understanding  of  the  orange  revolution  was  the  one 
favoured by the EU, its nuanced approach led to increasing disappointment by 
the  new  leaders  in  Ukraine,  who  sought  to  upgrade  Ukrainian  pledges  to 
European  integration  from  rhetoric  to  action.  The  ENP  was  regarded  as 88   Lic￭nia SIMÃO 
 
insufficient in this regard. Russia‟s reaction to the ENP further reinforced the 
view that it was inadequate to structure EU-Russia relations and, in that sense, it 
was just another topic on the extensive EU-Russia agenda (Delcour, 2007, p. 
135). Russia was keener on building new foundations for its strategic partnership 
with  the  EU,  based  on  an  equal  partnership.  Moscow‟s  major  goal  was  to 
develop  a  partnership  which  would  provide  Russia  with  opportunities  to 
cooperate  with  the  EU,  despite  the  lack  of  membership,  and  which  would 
simultaneously  reinforce  EU-Russia  cooperation  as  an  alternative  pillar  of  a 
multi-polar  world.  The  events  of  the  colour  revolutions  in  Georgia  and  in 
Ukraine, together with EU and NATO continuous expansions into the former-
Soviet area of influence, created a new understanding in Moscow of these events 
as important elements in geopolitical competition for influence. 
The events in Ukraine set Russia in a new course of action in the CIS. The 
lessons learned were extremely important for Moscow‟s more assertive and pro-
active  approach  to  Eurasia.  First  and  foremost,  an  important  speech,  partly 
reproducing the views of the official elite, began to develop among Russian 
media,  suggesting  that  the  orange  revolution  was  the  result  of  a  deliberate 
strategy by the west to “rob” Russia of Ukraine (Gr￤tz, 2010, p. 15). This was 
closely linked to the fears in Moscow that by pursuing the path of integration 
into the EU, Ukraine would abandon Russia-led formats of cooperation, namely 
the  CIS,  strategically  curtailing  Russia‟s  power  (March,  2006,  p.  98).  This 
discourse  poised  the  West‟s  approach  as  a  zero-sum  game,  which  neglected 
Russia‟s concerns in its neighbourhood, and ultimately posed a grave danger to 
the Russian domestic model of centralised governance. Therefore, we can say 
that Russia‟s reaction to the colour revolutions was aimed at two reinforcing 
goals: to prevent the establishment of anti-Russian leaderships in Ukraine and 
Georgia and the spread of the colour revolutions to Russia proper (Makarychev, 
2008, p. 14). 
The  EU‟s  visible  support  to  the  leaders  of  the  orange  revolution  in 
Ukraine and its support to the new Georgian President‟s pro-western rhetoric 
sparked a fierce debate in Moscow on how Russia could counter these events 
and reinforce its position as the centre of attraction to the CIS countries. Some of 
these  views  recycled  the  concept  of  Eurasianism  to  underline  Russia‟s 
innovative offers (Allison, Light and White, 2006, p. 162), others sustained that 
a more purposeful policy towards the near abroad would be necessary to foster 
pro-Russian  forces  among  civil  society  and  opposition  forces  (Makarychev, 
2008,  p.  14).  Ultimately,  Russia  began  a  policy  of  contention  with  its 
neighbours.  It  enforced  trade  embargos  on  Moldova  and  Georgia;  it  raised 
energy prices to market levels, initiating a series of “gas wars” with Ukraine 
which had significant impact in European and Ukrainian territories. The political 
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Russia‟s policies towards the near abroad (Nygren, 2008), as was the decision to 
resort to war in Georgia.  
Under  President  Putin,  Russia  was  very  actively  seeking  to  anchor 
Ukraine in the multilateral institutions of the post-Soviet space, as well as to 
become  a  central  economic  player  in  Ukraine‟s  strategic  sectors,  namely  its 
pipeline  infrastructures  (Samokhvalov,  2007,  p.  11).  As  the  Russian-backed 
candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, was elected President in 2009, Russia also sought 
to assure another fundamental aspect of its relations with Ukraine, which was the 
presence of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea. Overall, Russia‟s presence in Ukraine 
is considerable, although the orange revolution did present Ukrainian leaders 
with alternatives to Russian dominance. This heritage was visible in the efforts 
by the new Ukrainian President to get the EU and Russia to jointly manage the 
Ukrainian  pipeline  systems,  in  an  effort  to  boost  energy  security  in  Europe 
(RFE/RL,  2010).  The  debacle  of  the  orange  revolution  in  the  presidential 
elections of 2009 and the election of the Moscow-backed candidate has been 
regarded in Moscow as a positive step and an important victory in terms of 
maintaining its influence in the post-Soviet space. As far as the EU is concerned, 
there has been an attempt to underline the process instead of the outcome, as a 
proof of the positive development for Ukraine‟s democracy. The lawful conduct 
of elections is seen by some as the most important outcome for the country‟s 
political stability and ultimately the most important fruit of the orange revolution 
(Fischer, 2010). 
In the long run, Ukrainian anchorage to Euro-Atlantic integration has been 
halted. The promise made at the NATO Bucharest summit that both Georgia and 
Ukraine “would enter NATO”, seems rather disconnected from the realities on 
the  ground.  Relations  between  Brussels  and  Kiev  will  advance  based  on  a 
pragmatic and functionalist-oriented cooperation, rooted in the neighbourhood 
policy. Considering the political options of the new political forces in power, 
Brussels will have to find new ways to acknowledge Moscow‟s views on the 
role of Ukraine in European security.  
 
4. The War in Georgia 
1.  Besides the dispute for influence in Ukraine, Georgia has become another 
point of contention between the EU and Russia. Since the rose revolution in 
2003  brought  to  power  the  pro-western  President  Mikhail  Saakashvili, 
relations with Russia gradually worsened. Although Moscow did help Tbilisi 
mediate the departure of Aslan Abashidze from Ajaria (Samokhvalov, 2009, 
p.33), in a display of good faith towards the new authorities in Tbilisi, it soon 
became apparent that Georgia‟s positions were irreconcilable with Russian 
interests in the Caucasus region. Russia was particularly concerned with the 
increasing  cross-border  activities  of  insurgents  from  the  North  Caucasus, 
using  Georgian  territory  in  their  operations.  US  military  support  to  the 90   Lic￭nia SIMÃO 
 
Georgian armed forces was crucial at the time to improve Georgian oversight 
of its borders and thus remove a source of tension in the Georgia-Russia 
bilateral relations. 
2.  Gradually, however, Tbilisi‟s closer relations with the US and NATO and 
the deterioration of its relations with the Kremlin raised enormous pressure 
on regional stability. President Saakashvili‟s main goals for Georgia included 
on the one hand the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian 
territory,  including  from  the  breakaway  regions  of  Abkhazia  and  South 
Ossetia,  and,  on  the  other,  a  steady  path  towards  full  Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  These  were  two  irreconcilable  goals  with  Moscow‟s  own 
ambitions to remain a relevant and hegemonic power in the CIS. The EU 
cautiously  welcomed  the  events  of  the  rose  revolution,  despite  the 
enthusiastic appreciation of the Baltic and Polish leaders – EU candidates. 
Brussels  was  not  keen  on  hampering  its  relations with  Moscow  due to  a 
distant  and  unstable  country  like  Georgia.  The  number  of  advocates  for 
Georgia inside the EU was also reduced, and the complex situation on the 
ground, along with the increasing rhetoric by the new Georgian President for 
the EU to assume greater security functions in the region, only worked to 
keep EU leaders on a conservative note (Lynch, 2006, p. 53).  
3.  Eventually, the EU‟s Security Strategy called on the EU to take a more 
active role in the South Caucasus and the region was included in the ENP, in 
2004.  The  EU  therefore  reinforced  its  position  in  Eurasia  and  took  on 
increasing security functions in Georgia, understood here in a broad sense, to 
include the political and economic stabilisation of the country and through 
the work of the EU Special Representative, to assist Georgia in solving its 
conflicts. From 2004 until the war in August 2008, there were numerous 
crises  and  tensions  in  the  Georgia-Russia  relations  which  the  EU  had  to 
mediate to a certain extent (Vieira and Sim￣o, 2008). During the first years in 
power, Saakashvili sought to change the negotiation formats for the South 
Ossetian  conflict,  reducing  Moscow‟s  role,  and  ultimately  sought  the 
departure of all Russian military from Georgian territory, as agreed under the 
Treaty  on  Conventional  Armed  Forces  in  Europe.  As  events  in  Ukraine 
unfolded and western leaders began to speak of a fourth wave of liberation in 
Europe,  which  should  be  rewarded  with  Euro-Atlantic  integration  (Civil 
Georgia,  2005),  Russia‟s  muscle  started  to  flex.  Russia  imposed  what  is 
widely seen as politically-motivated economic sanctions on Georgia, closed 
its borders and imposed stricter visa-regimes. It also developed an aggressive 
policy of passport distribution among Abkhaz and South Ossetians, further 
infringing on Georgia‟s claimed sovereignty over these territories.  
4.  2008  was  the  year  of  all  opportunities  for  Ukrainian  and  Georgian 
integration into NATO. In the Bucharest summit both countries hoped to be 
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reluctance  to  support  this  step,  due  to  the  tensions  this  would  create  in 
relations  with  Russia.  Ultimately,  the  MAPs  were  not  agreed  upon,  and 
NATO  leaders  backtracked  on  their  position.  The  European  uncertainties 
were further reinforced with the deflagration of the war in South Ossetia, in 
August 2008. The hostilities were brief, from August 7 to August 12, when a 
cease-fire agreement was negotiated by the French President, holding the EU 
rotating presidency. Early EU reactions to the crisis included a repudiation of 
violence and a careful denouncing of Russia‟s actions by “older” EU member 
states,  as  opposed  to  loud  statements  by  some  of  the  “younger”  member 
states, concerned with what this meant to the security in Europe. Although 
the EU presented a united front in the Council statements, the challenge to 
follow through on the leadership role it took upon itself has proved difficult. 
Moreover,  President  Saakashvili  was  being  increasingly  regarded  as 
unpredictable  and  taking  an  authoritarian  turn,  which  was  negatively 
perceived  in  Brussels.  It  was  therefore  no  surprise  that  the  official  EU 
position was rather limited to acting as an honest broker between Russia and 
Georgia. Some European media outlets denoted understanding for Russia‟s 
actions,  as  retaliation  for  NATO‟s  expansive  policies  (New  York  Times, 
2008), and some EU politicians were quick to point their fingers at President 
Saakashvili for starting the war (УНІАN).  
5.  To  Russia,  the  case  was  presented  as  a  duty  to  intervene  and  stop 
Georgian aggression on South Ossetians and Russian citizens. The point was 
even made that Russia was acting to stop a genocidal campaign ongoing in 
South Ossetia (Schröder, 2008, p. 8). Although only part of these allegations 
were  confirmed  in  an  independent  report  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
(IIFFMCG – CEIIG, 2009), Russia sought to take the higher moral ground. It 
became nevertheless harder to keep it as its military campaign extended well 
into  Georgian  territory.  Strategic  attacks  on  energy  and  transport 
infrastructure  were  undertaken,  providing  evidence  of  Russia‟s  wider 
strategic goal of hampering Georgia‟s role as a transit country for Caspian 
energy  reserves  to  Europe.  Some  analysts  also  predicted  that  Russia  was 
aiming  to  undoubtedly  prove  its  hegemonic  position  in  its  sphere  of 
influence. The outcome might have been more limited than initially thought 
by  Moscow,  as  Russia  began  to  lose  the  battle  for  international  support, 
including within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Instead of warm 
support,  Russia  received  a  cold-shoulder  reaction  from  its  CIS  partners, 
concerned  that  this  might  symbolize  the  beginning  of  a  militant  and 
interventionist Russian policy in the CIS.  
6.  The intervention in Georgia is “[i]llustrative of Russia‟s resistance to the 
applicability of EU principles „as the cornerstones of a wider international 
order‟”  (Haukkala,  2009,  p.  1757).  President  Medvedev‟s  proposal  to 
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this revisionist policy of the Russian Federation. A fundamental aspect of this 
proposal,  as  articulated  by  Foreign  Minister  Lavrov  in  New  York,  is  the 
rending operational of the concept of indivisibility of security in Europe, seen 
as  “the  inadmissibility  of  strengthening  one‟s  own  security  by  infringing 
upon the security of others”. According to Emerson (2008) “This can be read 
as diplomatic language for what writers about geo-politics call „sphere of 
influence‟; which is not worthy of a „Helsinki-2‟, but more reminiscent of 
some infamous 20th century pacts”.  
7.  In fact, the war has been regarded by one prominent Russian analyst as 
being “caused by the inability of the existing European security institutions to 
prevent  both  internal  and  intra-state  conflicts  which  escalated  after  the 
bipolar confrontation was over” (Valdai Club, 2010). The same report clearly 
states that it was the Western countries‟ “geopolitical expansion plans” which 
caused the war in Georgia (Valdai Club, 2010) and that Russia initiated a 
“radical modernization and revision of the political, legal and institutional 
frameworks of the system of international and collective security in Europe” 
right before the war.  
 
5. Conclusions 
As these case studies sought to illustrate, the establishment of different 
and competing perceptions of the regional security environment in Europe has 
hampered the development of the EU-Russia relations and has undermined the 
existing security regime. Despite high expectations that the EU enlargement to 
Central and Eastern Europe would finally reunite the European continent and 
consolidate  a  norm-based  security  regime  shared  by  all,  the  reality  today  is 
strikingly different. Not only has the superiority of the European norms been 
disputed by Russia, but its exclusivist approach to the neighbourhood has been 
translated  into  new  division  lines,  which  the  under-conceptualised 
neighbourhood policy has been unable to address. The ENP potentially escalated 
competition in the neighbourhood shared with Russia, by building on ambiguity. 
The EU was comfortable by letting its Eastern neighbours expect membership 
perspectives,  as  long  as  it  controlled  the  pace  of  integration  and  could  do 
“damage control”. This escalated the rhetoric between the neighbours and Russia 
and ultimately changed the benign image of the EU in Russia. 
Moreover, the EU official speech portrayed EU governance expansions as 
apolitical  and  inclusive,  providing  benefits  for  all.  This  understanding  was 
contested in Moscow, which regarded the EU rules as favouring the EU and not-
necessarily Russia, or even the countries in the shared neighbourhood. As argued 
by Haukkala (2009, p. 1762) “[i]n fact, the EU can be envisaged as a regional 
normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set 
of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help to facilitate an active 
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to the so-called democratic revolutions, which created deep political instability 
in Ukraine, for instance. Moscow also saw the EU commitment to Euro-Atlantic 
integration in the CIS space as a fundamental challenge to the EU‟s stated desire 
to build a strategic partnership with Moscow, and to its commitment to shared 
security in Europe. The proposals of the Russian President to establish a new 
security treaty for Europe, albeit rhetorically welcomed as a valid contribution to 
the debate, have not been taken up by the European partners as an opportunity to 
debate the need for strengthening the security regime in Europe.  
After the war in Georgia and with the financial and economic impact of 
the global financial crisis, both the EU and Russia are looking at each other‟s 
potential.  The  partnership  for  modernisation  has  been  advanced  as  the  new 
motto for bilateral relations, although what will be fundamentally different in 
this  approach  is  still  to  be  seen.  Fundamental  differences  subside.  As 
Makarychev (2009, p. 7) argues, “Russia is more a norm-exploiter than a norm-
producer. It stays far-removed from multiple norm-producing initiatives on a 
trans-national  scale,  including  –  but  not  limited  to  –  norms  that  regulate 
transparency, accountability, sustainable development, good governance, and so 
on. If Russia remains aloof in these debates, communicative problems with its 
major Western partners are inevitable”.  
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